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The theological teachings of John Philoponus are important for several reasons: a) to see 
the real achievements and influences of Aristotelian logic in regard to theology, b) to see 
the real consequences of not accepting hypostasis as relational and ontologically based 
and c) to assess the real consequences of such teachings for Triadology and Christology.1
In modern scholarship and possibly at the time in which he lived, John Piloponus 
was better known and more recognized as a prominent commentator of Aristotle, than as 
a theologian. His importance is even greater, since some prominent researchers believe 
him to be the critical intermediary between Aristotle and the Arabs, through which he 
indirectly influenced the overall development of science in the West, and his ideas have 
contributed to the rejection of the teachings of Aristotle (Sorabji 1987: 41). Alongside, 
we find authors who, in contrast to Sorabji, consider the praise of Philoponus to be ex-
cessive and that his importance in philosophy is not nearly so large (Ebbesen 2008: 157).
John Philoponus (490–575) was a disciple of Ammonius Hermiae, the leader of 
the Alexandrian neoplatonic school, which was considered to be the educational center 
of the entire Orient (Grillmeier 1996: 102). Ammonius, disciple of Proclus, founded the 
Alexandrian exegesis of Aristotle, whose main objective was to harmonize it with Plato. 
Ammonius taught all the prominent Neo-Platonists of the next generation, including As-
clepius, Simplicius and Olympiodorus, with the exception of Damascius who left Alex-
andria after clashes with Christians in 488–489. (Devin 2011: 642). John was one of his 
most able students and publisher of his lectures (Benevich 2011–2012: 104).
John became famous as a prominent commentator and critic of Aristotle, and is 
considered to be one of the most original thinkers of Late Antiquity (Lang 2001: 3). In 
addition to the nickname Philoponus (Φιλόπονος – diligent) was also added the nick-
name Grammarian, as he called himself. John first studied philology, and only later be-
came interested in philosophy. The nickname Grammarian perhaps meant that he taught 
grammar in the Coptic community in Alexandria (Sorabji 1987: 5-6). Since he became 
involved with philosophy in a mature age, Simplicius mockingly called him, ὀψιμαθής 
one that studies in late years (Cael. 159, 3, 159, 7; Phys. 1133, 10; Verrycken 1990: 238). 
The nickname philoponus – ‘diligent’ was at that time unusual for scholars. Damascius 
called a few prominent Neo-Platonists ‘philoponus’, just as Athanasius the Great called 
Origen (De Decretis 27.1.). One also finds a suggestion that he got such a nickname be-
cause he joined one of the Christian fraternities that called themselves philoponi – the 
1 This is especially important, since even today, there are theologians who fail to understand the real 
meaning and contribution of the teachings of the Cappadocian Fathers (see Larše 2015).
Person and Nature, Hypostasis and Substance
Philosophical Basis of the Theology of John Philoponus
Aleksandar Djakovac
University of Belgrade, Faculty of Orthodox Theology
Aleksandar Djakovac74
diligent ones. From the testimonies of Zacharias Rhetor, who was a member of such a 
fraternity himself, we know that they existed in Egypt, that in these groups people gath-
ered who gave care to the poor and the sick and also those who were preparing for tough 
discussions with unbelievers and that some prominent Monophysites, such as Severus of 
Antioch were their members as well, at least at some point in time in their lives (Grill-
meier 1996: 110). Concerning Philoponus, this thesis has not been verified by evidence, 
only by an Arab legend.
Among experts it was discussed whether John was a Christian from birth, or if he 
became one later on. Gudeman (Gudeman 1916: 1764-95), argued that John was a pa-
gan who later became a Christian. His contention is based upon the fact that Philoponus 
only later in life wrote theological debates while he initially dealt only with comments 
on Aristotle. This thesis was challenged by Evrard (Evrard 1953) who claimed that John 
was a Christian from the beginning, as shown by his Christian name, while from his 
works one cannot conclude that he was a pagan. Moreover, Evrard believes that John 
has always been a faithful Christian, and that this is demonstrated in particular in his op-
position to Aristotle’s teaching on the eternity of the world. Philoponus’ effort to show 
that the world is not eternal but rather created, was fueled by Proclus’ writing De aeter-
nitate mundi contra Christianos, which seeks to demonstrate that, based on Aristotle’s 
logic, the world should be eternal, and that, consequently, the Christian doctrine of the 
world being created cannot withstand analytic philosophical criticism. It is interesting 
that Philoponus in his work De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum, nowhere calls upon 
divine revelation, but proves on purely philosophical grounds that the world must neces-
sarily have been created if we stick to the logic of Aristotle (Schrenk 1990: 153). The fact 
that Philoponus is writing against Proclus, indicates that he was a Christian, while the 
fact that in his writing he does not mention the Christian authorities can be interpreted 
as proof that he was not a Christian. Verrycken tried to bring these two different view-
points together (Verrycken 1990: 236). He agrees with Evrard that John was a Christian 
from the beginning, but considers that Gudeman’s insights are not unfounded, insofar as 
there indeed is a duality in John’s work in the first and the second period of his life (cf. 
Blumenthal 1986: 370). Verrycken believes that John was not a convert, but that in the 
first part of his life he might have been not interested in Christianity, and that he perhaps 
was even an apostate. In support of this thesis goes the claim of Zachariah the Scholastic 
(Verrycken 1990: 240) that John’s teacher Ammonius was known as someone who sep-
arates the Christian youth from Christianity.
Lang agrees with Verrycken that the philosophical work of Philoponus does not 
necessarily mean that he was not a Christian, since unlike the Athenian, the Alexandrian 
Neo-Platonists were not particularly hostile to Christians. Damascius, who listened to 
Proclus in Athens, even accused Ammonius of approaching Christian leaders for money 
(Chadwick 2010: 83). The Neoplatonic school at Alexandria not only stayed open at the 
time of Justinian, unlike the one in Athens, but continued to exist even in the period of Is-
lamic domination (Grillmeier 1996: 108). Evrard showed that Philoponus’ work cannot 
strictly be chronologically divided into philosophical and theological parts, as the Mete-
orology, his last comment on Aristotle and a pure philosophical work (Sorabji 2010: 17), 
was written after his De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum. On the other hand, De aeter-
nitate is also written in a philosophical rather than Christian discourse which may lead 
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to the assumption that the arguments presented were more directed against certain Pla-
tonists, namely Plutarch and Atticus, than paganism in its entirety. Sorabji supports the 
view that Philoponus used pure philosophical discourse without the Christian argument 
because the work was intended for the followers of Proclus who would not accept argu-
ments of a different kind (Sorabji 2010: 17). It is interesting that Share found seven ci-
tations from the Bible in this work (Share 2014: 4), which does not change the fact that 
this is a work written in philosophical language, although it leaves room for an interpre-
tation like the one given by Benevich (Benevich 2011-2012: 106), according to which 
Philoponus’ intention was to use purely philosophical arguments to refute philosophical 
points of view that contest Christianity. Such an assumption could be confronted by the 
fact that Philoponus’ eschatology, presented in a commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, 
cannot really be reconciled with the Christian eschatology (Van Roey 1985: 499). This 
can possibly be explained by the evolution of his way of thinking, although it still casts 
doubt on the explanation given by Benevich.
While it is clear that one cannot with absolute certainty assess Philoponus’ intel-
lectual development, it is clear that there was a transition in his interest from philosophy 
to theology. The fact that based on Philoponus’ philosophical works we cannot deter-
mine with certainty what his religious beliefs were, in itself says something, and pro-
vides a certain framework for understanding his later theological positions. By all ac-
counts, Philoponus was a Christian from the beginning, but he began to be engaged with 
theology later in life. The thesis that at the time of his philosophical creativity he was an 
apostate from the Christian religion is supported neither by sources nor can it be a re-
sult of the analysis of his work. Throughout the Christian tradition, Philoponus has al-
ways been accused of heresy but not of apostasy (Lang 2001: 6). Lang also emphasizes 
that the analysis of Philoponus’ theological work indicates a strong commitment to the 
issues he dealt with, which contradicts Verrycken’s opinion that Philoponus remained a 
disguised pagan until the end. However, even Lang admits that there was a certain tran-
sition in Philoponus’ life, from philosopher to theologian (Lang 2001: 8). And, he agrees 
with Wildberg, according to whom, when it comes to Philoponus’ Christian understand-
ing, there is only a difference in degree of emphasis (Wildberg 1987: 209). In this sense 
the hypothesis of MacCoull (MacCoull 1995: 269-279) isn’t credible either, for it goes 
to the other extreme, in claiming that the entire philosophical work of Philoponus was 
in the service of Monophysite theology. As noted by Sorabji (Sorabji 2010: 18), such a 
claim is incompatible with 2821 pages of comment on Aristotle, which Philoponus left 
for the world. It is a fact that Philoponus’ attack on Proclus in the year 529, with De 
aeternitate mundi contra Proclum, coincides with Justinian’s decision to close the neo-
platonic school in Athens. It is possible that Philoponus, in an atmosphere of complete 
dominance of Christianity in the time of Justinian, considered it to be beneficial to of-
fer his service as a seasoned logician to the Church, which was plagued with confusing 
Christological terminology (Chadwick 2010: 84). Even the work directed against Pro-
clus, which has nothing to do with the Monophysite dispute, could be seen as a form of 
flattery for the emperor in his attempt to philosophically refute and condemn Origen’s 
doctrine of the eternity of the world that overlapped with that of the Neoplatonists (Grill-
meier 1996: 111).
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Philoponus’ theological work, in which he insists on consistent monophysite ter-
minology as the sole correct terminology has not contributed to the unity of Christians. 
His involvement in the field of eschatology and Triadology, led to confusion and divi-
sion even within the community of monophysites. Philoponus believed that every na-
ture must have a proper hypostasis, which he understood as nature with special proper-
ties. According to him, there is no such thing as a universal essence. There is no abstract 
deity which subsumes the three hypostases of the Holy Trinity, but there are only three 
specific hypostases with specific characteristics in which they differ from each other and 
which actualize the divine essence. This concept of hypostasis we find in Posidonius 
(1st century BC), who was the first to introduce it in philosophy, as “actualization of ex-
istence” (Femić Kasapis 2010: § 4.7.4.) That view is consistent with the teachings of 
Cappadocian fathers. Still, Philoponus failed to point out and explain what the basis of 
the unity of the Holy Trinity was2. This considerable drawback led to charges of trithe-
ism. Moreover, Philoponus is considered as its prominent representative. Hence, he was 
condemned by several Monophysite Councils (Lang 2007: 81). Many Chalcedon theo-
logians, as we shall see, rightly considered tritheism to be arising from Monophysite 
Christology, namely from the understanding of hypostases as nature with special proper-
ties. This connection will be clear after analyzing Philoponus’ Monophysite Christology.
Philoponus intervened in the Christological disputes in an effort to strengthen the 
Monophysite argument using logical arguments from his comments on Aristotle (Lang 
2011: 11). The rationale he used is best presented in the work Arbiter (Diaitetes), writ-
ten in the time before the convening of the Fifth Ecumenical Council (553), probably 
with the aim to influence its decisions (Lang 2011: 30). According to Nikephoros Ka-
llistos, the Arbiter was dedicated to Sergius, the Monophysite Patriarch of Antioch who, 
at the time of the writing abided in Constantinople and was still a presbyter (Chadwick 
2010: 87). In fact, it was probably written shortly before 553, after Justinian’s Ὁμολο-
γία πίστεως of 551 composed against three chapters of the twelve anathemisms (Bolotov 
2006: 339). It is likely that the devoted commitment of Justinian to reconcile with the 
Monophysites encouraged Philoponus to engage in the discussion that was gaining mo-
mentum, and to strongly support the views of those who thought like him, especially as 
Justinian continued his protective policy towards the Monophysites, lead by Theodora 
(Grillmeier 1995: 347-9). Probably the atmosphere in Alexandria, where the clergy and 
the population majority advocated the monophysite position, influenced him as well. 
And, it is quite possible that he was invited by the advocates of Monophysitism to join 
the debate and contribute to their cause. The Arabian legend referred to by Verrycken 
(Verrycken 1990: 258-259), that he allegedly received money from Christians and that 
this is one of the motives of his volte-face is not supported by other sources, and can be 
considered as improbable.
In his Christological observations Philoponus held onto the already known mono-
physite arguments against Chalcedon theologians, including metaphors. So he liberally 
used the paradigm of relations between soul and body to describe the relationship of the 
two natures in Christ. According to him, in Christ all the rational movements of the soul 
are subordinated to divine action in the sense of instruments. As the body serves the soul 
2 Philoponus was acquainted with the works of the Cappadocians, whose influence on him, especially by 
Basil the Great has been proven beyond any doubt (Clemens 2015: 77-79).
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as an instrument, we can say that the whole divinity uses humanity as an instrument, so 
that there is only one act (Lang 2011: 44). This unity of acts accounts for a major reason 
for applying the analogy of soul-body to Christology. Philoponus sought to provide ap-
propriate terminological solutions in Christology only partially relying on the legacy of 
Cappadocia. Thus, in the definition of ‘nature’, he believes that the common content of 
the nature of each individual or hypostasis suits them, and does not correspond to any 
other member of the same species. This is important because of the Christological ap-
plication of the concept of ‘nature’. Because if you could say that the common nature of 
the Holy Trinity incarnated, then it would have to be attributed to all persons of the Holy 
Trinity, as it would, if the common human nature united with the Logos, which means 
that the entire human race united with Him (Lang 2011: 62). Philoponus therefore con-
siders that Cyril’s formula “one nature of God the Logos incarnated”, must be under-
stood in this sense (Arbiter VII, 23) — that is, that the phrase “God the Logos” serves 
to point out the distinction from God the Father and the Holy Spirit. Because of this, in 
Christ there is a unity of particular and not common nature (Lang 2011: 62). In terms of 
terminology, Philoponus equated hypostasis and nature, claiming that, if nature in Chris-
tology is perceived as particular, then nature and hypostasis are the same thing, except 
that hypostasis additionally marks those characteristics which separate one individual 
from another (Arbiter VII, 22.21-4 -53.92-5). Philoponus differentiates common nature, 
the particular nature (that nature which belongs to the individual) and hypostasis, which 
marks properties that distinguish it from other individuals. In this way, the hypostasis is 
understood as the particular nature with additional properties.3 
It is interesting that when it comes to the Holy Trinity, Philoponus believes that the 
terms ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον are synonymous, with the only addition that πρόσωπον 
denotes a mutual relationship (σχέσις πρὸς ἄλληλα) (Lang 2011: 65). This relatedness 
signified by the concept of πρόσωπον, which Philoponus talks about, for him, however, 
does not constitute an ontologically foundational fact. Πρόσωπον has the classic mean-
ing of mask, or representative (Arbiter VII, 25). Philoponus fails to notice, completely, 
the reasons why the Cappadocians introduced the term hypostasis into Triadology. In 
this sense we can say that Philoponus’ work represented an attempt at reversing such a 
line of theological development. When he talks about the way the natures in Christ are 
united, Philoponus insists that it’s a union of two things that are not united with respect 
to one another but by themselves yet they still differ by kind. This means that the unity of 
natures in Christ was not created as an external act, but that it happened according to the 
natures themselves. He therefore considers that the particular nature of the Logos was 
the one which is embodied, or united with human nature, creating a unity of the particu-
lar natures, so that it cannot be considered that the natures are united ‘less’ and ‘hyposta-
ses’ more, but both are united in the same degree. This view is based on the ontological 
priority of the essence in relation to the concrete being (Sirkel 2016: 357). That is why, in 
his opinion, Chalcedon is inconsistent, because it talks about two natures and one hypos-
tasis. According to him, if Chalcedon teaches about one hypostasis, then it must be ei-
ther complex or simple. If it is simple, then it must be said that Christ is God in the flesh, 
and if it is complex, this complexity is inevitably in nature, since it is the same as hy-
3 On the extensive philological analysis of the three terms, physis, ousia and hypostasis, from their first 
evidence to the Church Fathers, see: Фемић Касапис 2010. 
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postasis. Therefore, those who furthermore reject one complex nature, adopt multiplic-
ity of hypostases, which is Nestorianism (Grillmeier 1996: 114). Philoponus, therefore, 
did not understand the distinction the Cappadocians made in the meaning of hypostasis 
from the concept of nature that is equal with the concept of essence, as well as the impor-
tance of its relationality for its ontological foundation4. Hypostasis for him was just the 
nature with individual properties. He therefore considered that in accordance with Aris-
totelian logic one common nature may have more hypostases, but that two natures that 
have preserved the numerical duality cannot have one and the same hypostasis (Schrenk 
1990: 153), since for him hypostasis means the same or almost the same as the particular 
nature (Lang 2011: 69)5. Therefore, he vehemently opposed the Chalcedon confession of 
Christ ‘in’ two natures (ἐν δύο φύσεσι), insisting on the Monophysite ‘of’. According to 
him, it is impossible to speak of Christ, who is ‘in’ two natures, as one does not say that 
man is ‘in’ body and soul but of body and soul, and as one does not say that the trian-
gle is ‘in’ three corners but ‘’of’, and a house is of wood and stone rather than ‘in’ wood 
and stone (Chadwick 2010: 88). In The Arbiter Philoponus showed a certain willingness 
to compromise in that he stated that it is possible to accept the term ‘in’, although ‘of’ 
is more correct, if we talk about ‘a complex nature’, of Logos. Although from the point 
of view of the Chalcedon Fathers this was not a compromise, Philoponus waived it af-
ter the Council of 553, saying that it had been used only rhetorically. This was in line 
with the increased sharpness and intransigence he showed after the Council, particularly 
in the work Τμήματα or Tomi quattour contra synodum quartem (four sections against 
Chalcedon), a work that is not preserved except for one brief remark in Photius’ Biblio-
theca (55), who mockingly called it ‘a comedy in four acts’, and a wider recounting in 
the chronicle of Michael the Syrian (Chabot 1901: 92-121) where we draw upon infor-
mation about its content. Michael has, as he says, made a summary of Philoponus’ work, 
and he only lined up the arguments, providing evidence for the most important ones.
Philoponus tries to prove that any nature by necessity has a certain hypostasis. If 
Christ’s human nature existed before the union with deity, then it certainly should have 
had its own hypostasis, since one cannot imagine life without hypostases. If there was 
no human nature, nor hypostasis before the union with the Logos, then there is only one 
hypostasis and only one nature. For the same reason it cannot be accepted that the hu-
man hypostasis exists before union: the separate existence of a special nature cannot be 
accepted either, wherefrom it follows that there is only one nature.
In Philoponus’ time there was already a quite developed doctrine of forms of union. 
The loosest way of union was called παράθεσις, and that meant two things against each 
other. Παράθεσις exists with regard to items of the same kind, each of which could be re-
moved. The term μῖξις described a combination, and has been used to denote a condition 
in which certain properties of different things made it possible for them to be united, as 
in the case of iron and fire, or light and air. Chrysippus used such an analogy to describe 
the relationship of body and soul. The term κρᾶσις meant a more complete admixing, in 
which there is a partial loss of the original features, like mixing different substances that 
4 For the meaning of relational ontology, see Zizjulas 2015: 19-28.
5 Experts think that such an understanding by Philoponus is a direct application of the neoplatonic un-
derstanding of universals on Christology. The equalization of hypostasis with a concrete reality of particular 
nature can be found also in the works of Alexander of Aphrodisias (Quaestiones I, 3: 7. 32–8. 12).
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gives a product of a completely new quality, for example in making alloys. The term 
σύνθεσις marked the complete unity when an entirely new quality and a completely new 
end product occurs. (Grillmeier, 1995: 40). 
However, Philoponus did not claim that the properties of the divine and human 
nature changed into something else, but were preserved as in the case of body and soul, 
where the lesser is protected from the larger (Tmemata XI; Grillmeier 1996: 115). Since 
for Philoponus hypostasis represents the individual nature, among them there could not 
exist any difference in the degree of unity, so that one cannot claim any difference be-
tween them (Arbiter VII, 27-8-55.172-9). Philoponus supported the teachings about a 
complex nature, believing that Christ does not consist of only deity nor of humanity 
only (Lang 2011: 76). In his view, only properties that fall within the same genus can be 
mixed, while those that belong to different genera cannot. According to Aristotle, spe-
cies (εἶδος) is composed of a genus (γένος= gender) and specificity (διαφορά ). For ex-
ample, man is an animal by genus and according to the specificity, he is ‘two-legged’ 
(see Cat. 5 3a ~ 3, Top. VI. 4 14163 ~ -32ff). Following Aristotle, Philoponus claims 
that two genera cannot be mixed. This would be contrary to the basic logic, since genus 
represents the root joint and allows further differentiation. It is possible that Philoponus 
was under the influence of Porphyry and his interpretation of Aristotle, who for instance 
says that such а ‘gender’ (γένος) is a ‘living being’, the species is ‘man’ and the specific 
difference is ‘rationale’, and the peculiarity (of a species) is ‘he can smile’ (Isagoge 2, 
7). Also, genus corresponds to the question what something is, and the difference con-
cerns how that something is. “If anyone asks us what a man is, it should be said ‘a liv-
ing being’, because we said that ‘living being’ is the genus for ‘man’” (Isagoge 2, 107). 
Should it be asserted that man and God belong to the same genus, it would result in a de-
nial of the ontological difference of the material and immaterial (Herbert 1984: 3). Thus 
the properties of the apple, sweetness and color, do not belong to the same genus, and 
the sweetness does not affect color and vice versa. Philoponus states that speech is not 
a sentence, that sentence is not a syllabus, syllabus not a letter, but that all belong to the 
genus of ‘word’ (Chadwick 2010: 91). It is similar with the soul and the body, or with the 
deity and humanity, which are not subject to the same genus proximum and thus cannot 
be changed due to the union (Lang 2011: 80). The multiplicity of properties does not im-
ply a multiplicity of natures. Light and shining are properties of fire but not one of them 
is the nature of fire. Because of this, multiplicity of properties does not imply multiplic-
ity of natures. Hence, in Christ the multiplicity of properties is preserved, although there 
is only one complex nature and hypostasis (Arbiter VII, 38-40; Lang 2011: 82). “If by 
hypostases we mean the appropriate forms by which each person is different from those 
of the same essence – God Logos from His Father and the Holy Spirit, and we as indi-
viduals of the same species from other human beings – because it is not possible that the 
properties of the God Logos and the properties of His spiritualized body, which set Him 
apart from other human beings are the same – therefore it is not possible that there is any 
hypostasis of deity or humanity in Christ. On the contrary, as is the case with us living 
beings composed of body and soul, and I mean man, we who have one hypostasis and 
nature, so it is in the case of our Lord Jesus Christ who was constituted as a perfect total-
ity of divinity and humanity, and we must confess that He is of one complex hypostasis 
or nature” (Apol. I, 7: 66.28-67.6).
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Such Philoponus’ Christology has necessarily determined his Triadology. The in-
formed reader will recognize that the very fact of identification of nature and hypostasis 
points out problems that will inevitably arise in the field of Triadology. The distinction 
between γενικὴ οὐσία and ἰδικὴ οὐσία, which is essentially an application of Aristot-
le’s distinction of first and second substance, and identification of ἰδικὴ οὐσία with 
ὑπόστασις inevitably led to the question of unity of God. In the matter of terminology 
it’s even more complex, since Philoponus, in the only surviving fragment of Arbiter in 
Greek, provided by St. John Damascene (Louth 2005: 48), equates φύσις to πρόσωπον. 
Thus we get a terminological equivalence according to which the terms οὐσία, φύσις, 
ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον are equivalent. It is, therefore, neither accidental nor ground-
less that Philoponus was blamed for the introduction of Aristotle’s ontology into the-
ology (Lang 2007: 82). The legitimacy, even the necessity of the use of philosophy in 
theology was demonstrated by the Fathers before Philoponus. Nevertheless, his use of 
philosophy has not proved itself to be helpful. Equating Christological key concepts, by 
distinction of which the Cappadocian Fathers established the foundations of the Chris-
tian ontology of person, led to insoluble problems. If in the Holy Trinity we are talking 
about three hypostases which are identified with ἰδικὴ οὐσία, then it follows that there 
are three different natures which have their own independent existence. Philoponus had 
omitted the teachings of the Cappadocians on the Monarchy of God the Father, accord-
ing to which the Hypostasis of the Father is the cause and principle of the existence of 
the Son and Spirit. Since hypostasis for Philoponus was not equated with person, but 
represented only individual nature, for him it was not possible to establish the unity of 
the Holy Trinity. Determining the unity of the Holy Trinity on assumptions which were 
held by Philoponus, is only possible if the essence is declared to be the principle and 
source of God’s being. But then the price for that would be to relativize hypostasis. Since 
Philoponus didn’t try to determine the unity of the Holy Trinity on the grounds of na-
ture, and on the other hand didn’t establish it on the basis of the person of the Father as 
the Cappadocians did, his thesis led to three-deity. Philoponus’ reasons were related to 
the Christological implications of Triadology, of which he was aware. If he had consis-
tently applied the Triadology of the Cappadocians, the definition of hypostasis deriving 
from it should be applied to Christology, and then it would be impossible to defend the 
monophysite position, especially the persistent denial that hypostasis identifies with per-
son and semantically indicates distance from essence / nature. As noted by Lurje, from 
the perspective of Monophysites, this triadological explanation was the most consistent, 
although it’s not likely that St. Cyril would have agreed with him (Lurje 2010: 206).
Philoponus had not realized that it is necessary to distinguish between the divine 
and material mode of existence. In the fourth chapter of the Arbiter, he writes that that 
which is the general characteristic of human nature — to be rational and to die,6 when 
6 It is interesting that Philoponus in his work On Resurrection which is preserved only in fragments, but 
for which there is evidence by other authors, says that after the resurrection humans will have bodies that will 
be different from the present ones, and which – and this is important – will not be of the same nature as the 
ones we now have. This new body will be glorified while the current will completely vanish. This example 
only further confirms our belief that the main problem with Philoponus was that he failed to go beyond the 
boundaries of philosophical thought and therefore could not understand the term hypostasis in the sense 
in which it was defined by the Cappadocians (Schrenk 1990: 154-155). It should be mentioned here that 
Philoponus made one statement here which is very important, and that is the assertion that all that is created 
must perish. This teaching is called the principle of extinction. In patristics we can find similarities with this 
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it is regarded as concerning one individual, no longer affects anyone else. This he re-
inforces with the fact that when an individual of one species is suffering, another indi-
vidual does not, when one dies the others do not, when one is born, others aren’t (Ar-
biter VII, 22: 22,17). This is true — but we are talking about the mode of existence of 
the created and fallen nature. Philoponus is talking about separated or particulate exis-
tence (μερικωτάτην ὕπαρξιν) which belongs to the individual and “that does not coin-
cide with any other except itself. For the rational and mortal living creature that is in 
me is not shared with any other man” (Arbiter VII, 22: 21-23). In accordance with Aris-
totle7, Philoponus feels that a general nature does not exist except in the abstract, which 
is in line with other interpreters of Aristotle, like Alexander of Aphrodisias, for whom 
hypostasis represents ‘concrete and physical existence’ while for Ammonius of Alexan-
dria it was synonymous with εἶναι (Lang 2007: 94). Of course, the problem is not that 
Philoponus adopts the philosophical tradition according to which the nature or essence 
is not something that can be thought of independently of the concretely existing beings. 
The problem is that he understands hypostasis in a reduced way compared to the Cappa-
docians, identifying it only as an individual nature.
Philoponus claims that the hypostatic differences of the traits of divine persons 
are a specific distinction that belongs to every being in itself (αἱ καθ’ αὑτάς), which 
makes a substantial difference (οὐσιώδης διαφορά), which is stocked in the logos of es-
sence (λόγος τῆς οὐσίας) (Lang 2007: 96) corresponding to the same species. In this way 
Philoponus not only claims that the divine nature really exists in hypostases, but goes 
further and finds that there are three different natures, due to the differences of the hy-
postases, and that they do not belong to the same species. Since the divine nature is re-
ally divided numerically by the properties of every hypostasis, each of them represents 
a special kind, which are mutually different by their different essences (ἑτεροειδεῖς) (De 
theologia 13: 153).
In that case, we cannot talk about the unity of God, for such a theology does lead 
to three-deity. The problem in Philoponus’ setting was not that he claimed that nature 
can exist only in a specific hypostasis – this is nothing new, St. Gregory of Nyssa already 
claimed that8. The problem is that for him the term hypostasis had ontological value only 
insofar as it represented the actualization of γενικὴ οὐσία. Precisely because of that had 
the Cappadocian Fathers emphasized the equivalence of the terms οὐσία and φύσις on 
the one hand and their contrast to the terms ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον on the other. Hy-
postasis as a person was for the Cappadocians not only nature with special features, but 
the one person that when it comes to God is characterized by advantage in relation to na-
ture. The Hypostasis of God the Father is not determined by the natural characteristics of 
Deity, but it is the cause and the very nature of God. The debate about whether the trithe-
ism emerged as a result of the influence of philosophy on theology, or the misinterpre-
tation of some expressions of earlier Fathers is not essential here. Even if we agree with 
Lang’s thesis (Lang 2007: 87) that the interpretation of the Fathers had a key role in de-
understanding but never in the form of necessity, but more in the form of a possibility. Creation could slip 
into non-being because it is created. For Philoponus, this claim has become an imperative – the creation must 
disappear.
7 For instance in De anima 402b: τὸ δὲ ζῷον τὸ καθόλου ἤτοι οὐθέν ἐστιν ἢ ὕστερον – which is directed 
against Plato’s understanding of the ontological topic of generality.
8 In Ep. 38, 2, which was preserved under the Name of Basil the Great.
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fining the tritheism theology, the fact remains that this interpretation was carried out un-
der the influence of philosophical doctrines, especially Aristotle. Philoponus’ reasons for 
his tritheism position are based on philosophical reasons (Osborne 1989: 390). After all, 
the impact of philosophy on theology is not exactly a novelty. The problem is this: since 
like the Nestorians, Monophysites tried to solve the problem of the incarnation based on 
nature and not on person, they came to the conclusion that the nature of God the Logos 
was the one which was embodied, and not His person. If the nature was embodied, then it 
must be the one divine nature that involves the other two persons of the Holy Trinity, for 
the divine nature does not exist by itself, i.e. it exists as such only in our minds, while in 
reality it exists only in the concrete hypostases, where the term ὑπόστασις is understood 
as nature with special properties. Since they did not distinguish between nature and per-
son, Monophysites came to the paradoxical situation that for the sake of preserving the 
oneness of Christ they sacrificed the unity of the Holy Trinity. Tritheism, which emerged 
as a result of the radical fight against Nestorianism in the field of Christology, appeared 
as a triadological Nestorianism. Philoponus consistently applied the presuppositions of 
the Christology he advocated on to Triadology.9 In accord with Aristotle, he could not 
accept the existence of the divine nature in itself, in which concrete hypostases partic-
ipate. But, as we have seen, the Cappadocians didn’t claim that, either. The problem is 
that by reducing hypostases to nature, Philoponus neither terminologically nor concep-
tually could find a way to postulate the unity of the Holy Trinity, which in the Cappado-
cian theological tradition is grounded not in the unity of nature, but in the oneness of the 
person of God the Father as the source and cause of God’s being.
The charges against Philoponus, brought forth by George the Hieromonk, which 
said that he in theology used the ἀριστοτελικαὶ τεχνολογίαι (Lang 2007: 83), were by no 
means unfounded. Philoponus understood the term hypostasis in a limited way and only 
as individual properties of nature. If we agree with such an understanding of the term, 
then his argument would be sustainable, and the Chalcedon Council would be wrong. 
However, if we understand hypostasis not only as individual properties of nature, but as 
a certain way of existence of natures that transcends – although also includes – their gen-
eral and individual properties, then things stand quite differently. And herewith lies the 
basis of Philoponus’ and generally of the Monophysites’ lack of understanding of Chal-
cedon. For Chalcedon, hypostasis is not the same as individual properties. Hypostasis 
is a concrete way of existence that includes natural properties, both general and specific 
(because it is clear that as there is no nature without hypostasis, so there is no hypostasis 
without nature, or natural features), but which – when it comes to the Holy Trinity – is 
not determined by these properties. The mystery of incarnation, at least as it was under-
stood by the Chalcedon Fathers, and later by St. Maximus the Confessor, on the basis of 
Cappadocian theology is possible precisely because of the fact that the Divine Hyposta-
ses are not determined by their natural properties. This observation of the relationship of 
nature and hypostasis is from the point of view of material nature impossible, since when 
it comes to material nature, the opposite is true – hypostasis, or person, is determined by 
9 Among the Monophysites, something similar happened with Julian of Halicarnassus, who consistently 
deducted the consequences of the Christology of Severus and concluded that the body of Christ, because of 
the unity of natures, was undecaying even before the Resurrection. Julian and Philoponus were both con-
demned by the Monophysites. But that condemnation only negated their conclusions, though the premises 
they started on were not questioned (see Đakovac 2015: 201-214).
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nature. The next key feature of the Cappadocian concept of hypostasis that Philoponus 
also didn’t have in mind is relatedness. Earlier we mentioned that Philoponus, however, 
did talk about hypostases in terms of relationality. However, he didn’t understand the re-
lationality of hypostases ontologically. For him, hypostasis, as an individual nature, first 
exists and only thereafter enters into a relationship. The relationship is not constitutive 
of it, rather, it is somewhat arbitrary. For the Cappadocians however, person does not 
simply exist in and of itself, but in relation to another person which gives it its identity. 
It is in these segments that we see the difference between the philosophical and theolog-
ical use of these terms, which Philoponus did not take into account. By preserving philo-
sophical consistency, Philoponus came to a conclusion that was logically sustainable. 
However, he failed to keep pace with the terminological and conceptual leap made by 
the Cappadocian Fathers, who were followed by the Council in Chalcedon. Philoponus 
remained a prisoner of Aristotle’s logic which (again), in and of itself, showed itself as 
insufficient for use in theology.
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